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RETHINKING THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL TRUST




It has been 175 years since Chief Justice John Marshall described
the relationship of sovereign Indian tribes to the United States as "re-
sembl[ing] that of a ward to his guardian" because tribes "look to our
government for protection" and could "perhaps, be denominated domes-
tic, dependent nations."'  Fifty years after the Cherokee cases, this
loosely-drawn analogy, originally based on treaty provisions pledging
the protection of the United States to ensure the sovereign rights of cer-
tain tribes, had transmuted into the legal and historical fact of literal
wardship.2 In United States v. Kagama,3 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of an act of Congress extending the criminal jurisdiction
of the United States over crimes committed by Indians against Indians
within Indian country.4 The power of Congress to govern Indian tribes in
this fashion could not be located in any textual provision of the Constitu-
tion. Rather, the Court based such power on the "wardship" status of
Indian tribes:
These Indian Tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communi-
ties dependent on the United States, - dependent largely for their
daily food; dependent for their political rights. They owe no alle-
giance to the states, and receive from them no protection .... From
their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of
dealing of the federal government with them, and the treaties, in
which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and
with it the power.
5
The Kagama formulation is frequently cited as the basis for the fed-
eral government's exercise of extra-constitutional and extra-statutory
powers, and commentators and tribal advocates have correctly pointed
t Mr. Berkey is a partner at Alexander, Berkey, Williams & Weathers LLP and specializes
in the area of tribal environmental protection, cultural resource protection, water rights and land
claims. He has worked in the field of Indian Law more than twenty-five years, as a staff attorney and
the Washington Director of the Indian Law Resource Center, in Washington, D.C. as a senior trial
attorney in the Indian Resources Section of the Environment and Natural Resources Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, and in private practice. Mr. Berkey thanks Scott Williams for his assistance
in the preparation of this Article.
1. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
2. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
3. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
4. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 385.
5. Id. at 383-84.
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out that this aspect of the so-called trust responsibility has furnished the
jurisdictional basis for many of the destructive policies and practices of
the United States.6 Yet, tribes and their attorneys have also relied on the
trust responsibility, in particular the lofty rhetoric of a few Supreme
Court opinions, 7 to craft a legal theory designed to hold the federal gov-
ernment accountable for management of Indian land and resources, or in
approving unwanted development on tribal lands.
Although it is now "undisputed" that there is a "general trust rela-
tionship between the United States and the Indian people,"8 the specific
contours of the trust obligation of the United States have been difficult
for courts to define. It was not until United States v. Mitchell in 1983
that the Supreme Court ruled that the Department of the Interior could be
held to account in money damages for its mismanagement of Indian re-
sources.' 0 The reason specific applications of the trust obligation have so
confounded courts may lie in its murky origins. The guardianship anal-
ogy of the Cherokee cases does not fit easily into the trusteeship concept
of the modern cases.' Another possible explanation for the lack of doc-
trinal clarity may concern the difficulty of applying conventional rules of
private trusteeship arrangements to the conduct of federal agencies as
trustees, especially when the goal is to hold the United States account-
able in damages under the Tucker Act. 12 Then again, more pedestrian
concerns may be at play in the judicial reluctance to endorse a legal the-
ory that might subject the federal treasury to a flood of money damage
awards.
Mitchell appeared to give new life to efforts to use trust theories and
fiduciary standards in Indian rights litigation, although its standard of
federal "control or supervision" of trust assets as the prerequisite for trust
duties has proven to be exceedingly difficult to meet., 3 With regard to
6. See, e.g., Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal In-
dian Control Law, 31 MICH. J. L. REFORM 899, 950-51 (1998).
7. See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942) (affirming the
"distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent
and sometimes exploited people.").
8. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983).
9. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
10. See Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 225.
11. See id. at 235 n.8 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he duties of a trustee are more intensive
than the duties of other fiduciaries.").
12. 28 U.S.C. §1491 (2005). Stating a claim under the Tucker Act requires a showing that a
particular statute mandates compensation against the United States for its violation. Mitchell, 463
U.S. at 217. No such requirement appears to apply to breach of trust suits against private trustees.
13. See, e.g., Pawnee v. United States, 830 F.2d 187 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Individual Indian
beneficial owners of mineral interests failed to state a claim against the Secretary of the Interior for
underpayment of oil and gas royalties because the Government's fiduciary obligation is met by
complying with the leases and applicable statutes and regulations.); United States v. Navajo Nation,
537 U.S. 488 (2003) (rejecting a claim of $600 million in damages arising from Secretary of the
Interior's approval of coal lease amendments setting a royalty rate of 12.5% rather than 20% of the
lessee's gross revenues. The Court could find no statute or regulation that created a duty enforceable
in an actioh for damages under the Tucker Act). There are dozens of such cases pending today. See,
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natural resource development on Indian lands, the doctrine of federal
trusteeship is relevant in principally two ways: first as a legal theory to
obtain injunctive relief to stop the federal government from approving
development that Indian tribes and tribal communities oppose; and sec-
ond, as a legal theory to hold the United States accountable in damages
for authorizing development on terms Indian tribes believe are unfair or
unreasonable, or for authorizing development that injures significant
tribal lands or resources.' 4 This Article focuses primarily on the use of
the trust doctrine to obtain injunctive relief, although, as explained be-
low, the courts have imported the standard for stating a cause of action
for damages into claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.
In light of the preservation goals of the trust responsibility, natural
resource protection is a logical field for its use. Although the federal
environmental statutes are invariably the core of most Indian environ-
mental cases, in most cases those statutes are inadequate to sufficiently
protect the conservation and preservation values and goals of tribes.' 5 In
particular, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 16 and the Na-
tional Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), 17 the most frequently invoked
environmental statutes, provide primarily procedural protections de-
signed to ensure a full and complete record on which to assess the impact
of federal actions on the environment. 8 These statutes obligate federal
agencies to take into account the consequences of their actions on the
environment and on historic properties and to consult with the affected
parties to ensure that all potential short term and long term environ-
mental effects are considered.' 9 In virtually every case, courts note that
such statutes do not dictate a particular substantive result.
20
Indian tribes have resorted to trust theories to fill the gaps left by
environmental statutes. The reliance on trust theories for such purposes
raises a number of questions: Can the trust responsibility be used to re-
quire federal agencies to do more than adhere to the procedural require-
e.g., Alan R. Taradash, Tribal and Allottee Trust Asset Cases Pending in 2003: Brief Case Summa-
ries, in COURSE MATERIALS, 28TH ANNUAL FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION INDIAN LAW CONFERENCE
121-29 (2003). The "control or supervision" standard may have been modified by the Supreme
Court in United States v. White Mountain Apache, 537 U.S. 465, 475 (2003), where the Court ruled
that statutory language that property is held "in trust" supports a "fair inference" that an obligation to
preserve the property is incumbent on the United States as trustee even if the statute did not ex-
pressly subject the Government to specific management duties.
14. See Mary Christina Wood, The Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal Lands and
Resources Through Claims for Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies, 39 TULSA L. REV. 355,
364-68 (2003).
15. See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New Trust
Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 109, 117.
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (2005).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 470 (2005).
18. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47; 16 U.S.C. § 470.
19. See 42 U.S.C. §§4321-47; 16 U.S.C. § 470.
20. See, e.g., Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 117 F.3d 1520, 1536
(9th Cir. 1997) ("NEPA is designed to ensure a process, not a result").
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ments of NEPA and NHPA? Is there a legally enforceable obligation on
federal agencies to act in the best interests of tribes in decisions that af-
fect the tribe's environment? Is the "general trust relationship" between
the United States and tribes merely descriptive or does it impose pre-
scriptive legal duties? To take one concrete example, does the trust re-
sponsibility require federal agencies to restore harvestable runs of
salmon in the Pacific Northwest, rather than just viable runs?
21
The federal courts that have addressed these questions have not
given consistent answers. Over two decades ago, several cases raised the
possibility that the trust responsibility could become an enduring source
of authority to enforce the obligation of the federal government to protect
tribal natural resources.22 With few exceptions, however, the efficacy of
the trust doctrine in the environmental area has steadily weakened since
then, a trend that perhaps mirrors the lamentable state of Indian law in
the federal courts generally. 23 The promise of the early cases has thus
not been realized.
In 1980 in Northern Slope Borough v. Andrus,24 Native villages in
Alaska and several environmental organizations challenged the decision
of the Department of the Interior to lease offshore areas in the Beaufort
Sea for oil and gas development.25 The plaintiffs' principal objection
was that the leasing would jeopardize the Bowhead and Gray whale
populations and other animal species that were used by Alaska Natives
for subsistence purposes.26 The plaintiffs' theories of relief included the
trust responsibility and various environmental statutes.27
The district court accepted the villages' argument that the statutes
designed to protect animals from extinction impose a trust responsibility
on the Federal government to "protect the Alaskan Natives' rights of
subsistence hunting., 28  Noting that the trust responsibility does not
"transcend the statutes creating that responsibility," the court nonetheless
relied on the trust doctrine to buttress the Government's statutory duties:
[The trust responsibility] serves three purposes, to wit: (1) it pre-
cludes the use of environmental statutes to undermine the subsistence
21. See Charles F. Wilkinson, Indian Tribal Rights and the National Forest: The Case of the
Aboriginal Lands of the Nez Perce, 34 IDAHo L. REv. 435 (1998) (discussing the Nez Perce Tribe's
relationship with the United States Forest Service and the Forest Service's duty to protect treaty
fights and noting the conflict between the tribe and the Forest Service over the standard required by
the United States to provide harvestable runs of salmon).
22. See, e.g., Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 225.
23. See North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1980) (epitomizing the
weakening of the trust doctrine in the environmental area). See also Wood, supra note 15 at 211-12
(noting that some courts in regard to public lands have "insisted that a trust duty off the reservation
be predicated on express language in a statute, treaty, executive order.").
24. 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1980).
25. See id.
26. Id. at 340-41.
27. Id. at 344-47.
28. Id. at 344.
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cultures, (2) it requires the Secretary to be cognizant of the needs of
the Inupiat culture, and (3) it demands of the Federal government
(and thus the courts) rigorous application of the environmental stat-
utes to protect the species necessary for the Inupiats' subsistence.
29
Applying these standards, the court upheld the Native villages'
claims under NEPA and the Endangered Species Act, because of defi-
ciencies in the Environmental Impact Statement and the biological opin-
ion adopted under the Endangered Species Act to reduce the likelihood
that leasing would jeopardize endangered species.
30
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's interpretation of
the trust responsibility, but reversed its conclusion that the trust obliga-
tions had not been met.3' The court concluded that the Secretary of the
Interior had "fulfilled his trust obligation" by giving "purposeful atten-
tion to the special needs of the Inupiats" and "obvious consideration" to
their fears of the impact of the leasing on their subsistence needs.32 The
court further relied on the fact that the Secretary followed the advice and
recommendations of an assistant secretary "which were aimed at easing
any adverse impacts on the Inupiats. The court cautioned, however,
that the trust responsibility does not give the Native villages "an overrid-
ing veto staying the Secretary's hand with respect to other public con-
cerns."
34
The second promising case was Northern Cheyenne Tribe v.
Hodel.35 There, the Tribe sought to overturn the decision of the Depart-
ment of the Interior to sell coal leases on lands adjacent to the Tribe's
Reservation. 6 The Tribe's primary concern was that the Department
failed to adequately consider and mitigate the adverse social, economic
and cultural effects of the lease sale on the tribe.37 The Tribe argued that
the decision to sell the leases violated the trust obligations of the De-
partment, as well as NEPA and the Federal Coal Leasing Act. 8
The district court ruled that the trust responsibility or "special rela-
tionship" is an independent source of legal duty on the Department to
consider and mitigate the potential impacts of the lease sale on the
Tribe.39 The court held that the trust obligation was violated:
29. Id.
30. Id. at 362.
31. North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
32. Andrus, 642 F.2d at 612.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 613.
35. [1985] 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Lawyer Training Program) 3065 (D. Mont. 1985).
36. Hodel, [1985] 12 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Lawyer Training Program) at 3065.
37. Id. at 3066.
38. Id. at 3067-71.
39. Id. at 3070.
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Ignoring the special needs of the tribe and treating the Northern
Cheyenne like merely citizens of the affected area and reservation
land like any other real estate in the decisional process leading to the
sale of the Montana tracts violated this trust responsibility. Once a
trust relationship is established, the Secretary is obligated, at the very
least, to investigate and consider the impacts of his action upon a po-
tentially affected Indian tribe. If the result of this analysis forecasts
deleterious impacts, the Secretary must consider and implement
measures to mitigate these impacts if possible. To conclude that the
Secretary's obligations are any less than this would be to render the
trust responsibility a pro forma concept absolutely lacking in sub-
stance.
40
More recently, the courts have taken a more jaundiced view of the
trust responsibility as a source of independent duties in environmental
cases. The hostility of federal courts to trust arguments in the environ-
mental area can be illustrated by four recent cases. In Morongo Band of
Mission Indians v. Federal Aviation Administration,41 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled, inter alia, that the Government's duty under the
trust responsibility is discharged by its compliance with its duties under
the environmental statutes.42 In that case, the Tribe challenged a new
aircraft arrival route into Los Angeles that would traverse the Morongo
Reservation and harm the Tribe's religious and cultural practices that
required quiet reservation areas.43 Rejecting the Tribe's argument, the
court ruled that the Government's trust duties were coterminous with its
statutory duties:
Thus, although the United States does owe a general trust responsi-
bility to Indian tribes, unless there is a specific duty that has been
placed on the government with respect to Indians, this responsibility
is discharged by the agency's compliance with general regulations
and statutes not specifically aimed at protecting Indian tribes.
44
The Ninth Circuit followed a similar approach in Skokomish Indian
Tribe v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.45 There, the Skoko-
mish Tribe sought judicial review of FERC's denial of its application for
a permit to develop a hydropower facility on the North Fork of the
40. Id. at 3071.
41. 161 F.3d. 569 (9th Cir. 1998).
42. Morongo Band, 161 F.3d at 574.
43. Id. at 572.
44. Id. at 574. The court mistakenly relied on Mitchell for the proposition that trust duties
arise only if the Government has assumed "elaborate control" over the trust property. Id. Mitchell
did not require elaborate control as the prerequisite for trust duties; rather, only "control or supervi-
sion" over trust assets is required. Brown v. United States, 86 F.3d 1554, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
("The Supreme Court [in Mitchell] did not qualify 'control or supervision' with modifiers such as
,significant,' 'comprehensive,' 'pervasive,' or 'elaborate.' Nor did the Court anywhere suggest that
the assumption of either control or supervision alone was insufficient to give rise to an enforceable
fiduciary duty.").
45. 121 F.3d 1303 (9th Cir. 1997).
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Skokomish River in Washington State.46 The Tribe intended to ensure
that future development on the River would be consistent with its goal to
restore the fishery that had been devastated by an existing hydro-electric
project dam.47 FERC rejected the Tribe's application on the ground that
it conflicted with the relicense application of the existing facility.
48
The Court of Appeals upheld FERC's decision on the ground that it
had properly concluded that the applicable regulations barred the Tribe's
application.49 With little analysis, the court rejected the Tribe's argu-
ment that FERC had "ignored its trust responsibility toward [the
Tribe]. 5° Conceding that the Government's trust responsibility "consists
of acting in the interests of the tribes," the court nonetheless concluded
that the doctrine required no more than compliance with the applicable
statutes and regulations. 51 The court noted that FERC "exercises this
responsibility in the context" of the Federal Power Act (FPA) and en-
dorsed FERC's practice of refusing to "afford Indian tribes greater rights
than they would otherwise have under the FPA and its implementing
regulations. 52 As a result, the trust responsibility does not compel ac-
ceptance of a tribal application that is barred by FERC regulations.
The third illustrative case is Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida
v. United States.53 In that case, the Tribe brought breach of trust claims
against the Department of the Interior and Army Corps of Engineers for
their failure to alleviate hurricane-related flooding on three parcels of
tribal land.54 As manager of Everglades National Park, the federal gov-
ernment had the capability to substantially reduce the level of flooding
inundating tribal lands.55 The district court rejected the claims. 56 The
court culled from the applicable case law the following governing princi-
ple: "[D]espite the general trust obligation[s] of the United States to Na-
tive Americans, the government assumes no specific duties to Indian
tribes beyond those found in applicable statutes, regulations, treaties or
other agreements. 57 The court's review of the applicable statutes and
regulations failed to identify specific enforceable duties to protect the
Tribe's land from flooding.58
46. Skokomish Indian Tribe, 121 F.3d at 1304.
47. Id. at 1305.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1306.
50. Id. at 1308.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1308-09.
53. 980 F. Supp. 448 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
54. Miccosukee, 980 F. Supp. at 451.
55. See id. at 453, 455, 457.
56. Id at 463.
57. Id. at 461.
58. Id.
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The fourth example of the failure of the trust doctrine as a source of
protection for tribal environments is Gros Ventre Tribe v. United
States.59 In that case, the Tribes of the Fort Belknap Reservation sought
an injunction ordering the Bureau of Land Management to reclaim and
restore abandoned gold mining sites located adjacent to the Tribes' Res-
ervation in Montana. 60 The Tribes relied in part on the federal govern-
ment's trust responsibility to protect tribal land and resources, which had
been poisoned by the mines, as the source of the legal duty to clean up
and restore the mining sites.61 The district court rejected this theory be-
cause it could find no "judicial support for the notion that the trust obli-
gation can be enforced independently of some other source of law."
62
In recent years, trust arguments have been successful only in cases
where the federal agency is defending actions taken to benefit Indian
tribes.63 In such cases, the trust responsibility fills the gap left by am-
biguous authorizing statutes.64 Northwest Sea Farms, Inc. v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers65 is an example. There, a salmon farm
operator sued to enjoin the Corps' decision to deny a permit to farm the
treaty fishing grounds of the Lummi Nation.66 The farm operator argued
that the Corps may not deny the permit solely on the ground that the pro-
ject will be located in waters where the Lummi Nation has treaty fishing
rights.67 The Corps responded that its trust responsibility required it to
consider Indian treaty rights in its decision.68  The court accepted the
Corps' argument. The court concluded that the trust responsibility re-
quires that the Government take appropriate action to ensure that Indian
treaty rights are "given full effect" and that such rights are "not abro-
gated or impinged upon. 69  Such action is required even though the
Corps' reliance on treaty rights is not specifically authorized by its own
regulations.7°
Northwest Sea Farms is an exception to the rather dismal fate of the
trust responsibility in recent Indian environmental cases. Judicial reluc-
59. 344 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (D. Mont. 2004).
60. Gros Ventre, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 1224-25.
61. See id. at 1226.
62. Id. at 1227.
63. See Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Christie, 812 F.2d 1097, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing
how the Secretary of the Interior acted with intentions to protect the needs of all Indian groups);
Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 194-95 (1993) (discussing how the trust relationship had a priority to
protect a broad class instead of a subgroup); Northwest Sea Farms, Inc. v. United States, 931 F.
Supp. 1515, 1520 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
64. See Northwest Sea, 931 F. Supp. at 1520.
65. 931 F. Supp. 1515 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
66. Northwest Sea, 931 F. Supp. at 1518-19.
67. Jd. at 1519.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1520.
70. See Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 546 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that the Secretary of
Commerce did not act arbitrarily in construing the trust responsibility as requiring the reformation of
fishing recommendations of the Pacific Fishery Management Council in order to guarantee that the
Yurok Tribe and the Hoopa Valley Tribe would receive their fair share of the salmon harvest).
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tance to impose substantive trust duties on federal agencies can perhaps
be attributed to the following factors: (1) judicial confusion about the
different legal standards for stating a claim for damages against the
United States under the Tucker Act and a claim for injunctive relief un-
der the Administrative Procedures Act; (2) the inherent difficulty of
courts determining the "best interests" of tribes; (3) concern that substan-
tive fiduciary obligations may become an "Indians always win" rule; (4)
the general direction of federal Indian law to rely on statutes and treaties,
rather than federal common law, for the rule of decision; and (5) the mis-
conception that the rationale for the trust responsibility - the need for
federal protection - may have lost some of its force in light of the eco-
nomic gains a number of tribes have achieved through gaming success.
Although no court has expressly articulated these reasons, the trend of
recent results in the Indian trust cases appear to justify such inferences.
Each of these reasons is discussed below.
First, courts have failed to acknowledge and apply the distinction
between stating a cause of action for damages against the United States
under the Tucker Act and stating a cause of action for declaratory and
injunctive relief against federal agencies under the Administrative Proce-
dures Act.71 The failure to appreciate this distinction has resulted in the
erroneous rule that the federal government satisfies its trust obligations if
it complies with applicable statutes, unless a statute or treaty imposes
specific duties apart from such statutes.72 The distinction is important
because, as noted, a damages claim requires a showing that a particular
statute can be fairly read as mandating compensation against the United
States for its violation, whereas an equitable claim under the Administra-
tive Procedures Act requires only a showing that the federal agency ac-
tion is "not in accordance with law" or "arbitrary [and] capricious., 73 It
is simply wrong to import the showing of a specific statutory basis for
damages to equitable claims that are not seeking such relief.
Second, courts may be reluctant to get into the thorny problem of
discerning the best interests of tribes under the trust responsibility, espe-
cially because the tribes themselves are often divided about the proper
course of action in the environmental area. Commentators have noted
this dilemma.74 Even resorting to the original principles of federal Indian
law, such as protection of tribal sovereignty and cultural autonomy, may
71. Examples of these cases include: Okanogan Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d
468, 471,479 (9th Cit. 2000); Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 573-74 (9th
Cir. 1998); Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States, 344 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1225-27 (D. Mont. 2004); San
Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 2d 860, 882-84 (D. Ariz. 2003). For criticism of
this line of cases, see Wood, supra note 14, at 363-68.
72. See Wood, supra note 14, at 364-65.
73. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2005).
74. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 15, at 126 ("Virtually any rendition of the 'best interests'
standard will fail to resonate with every tribe and every tribal member," because the tribal commu-
nity is enormously diverse.).
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not be particularly helpful in divining whether a proposed federal action
promotes the affected tribe's "best interests." Is it the best interest of
tribal sovereignty to authorize and locate a solid waste dump on tribal
land?75 To be sure, courts should not shrink from the responsibility of
deciding hard cases or giving force to the trust responsibility, solely on
the ground that the issue presents difficult choices. But it is up to the
tribes and their advocates to develop a coherent formulation of the "best
interest" standard under the trust responsibility, a standard that courts can
apply with reason and predictability.
76
Third, courts may be concerned that enforcement of trust duties
which are not directly tied to statutory or treaty provisions is a slippery
slope leading to a rule that tribal litigants will always prevail. 7 As the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has pointedly noted: "That there is such
a general fiduciary relationship does not mean that any and every claim
by [an Indian party] necessarily states a proper claim for breach of the
trust.' ' 7 8 Especially if the "best interest" standard is a subjective test de-
pending on the tribes' own articulation of their interests, courts may be
concerned about endorsing a standard that has few limits.
Fourth, the pronounced trend in federal Indian law generally away
from reliance on federal common law toward specific statutes and trea-
ties as the rule of decision may have influenced the trust doctrine's fail-
ings in the environmental area.79 The dominance of a textualist judicial
philosophy in the U.S. Supreme Court, as exemplified by Bourland and
similar cases, has made the application of a common law trust obligation
problematic. 80 This trend makes it more difficult for tribes and their ad-
vocates to overcome the presumption of the Mitchell line of cases that
trust duties must be based on specific language in statutes, regulations or
treaties that give the Government control or supervision over Indian land
or resources.
Fifth, anecdotal evidence that a few select tribes have realized eco-
nomic gains from gaming enterprises may lead courts to question
75. See Backcountry Against Dumps v. EPA, 100 F.3d 147, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
76. Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1981) is an example of the difficulty of deter-
mining where the best interests of the tribes lie. In that case, the court had to decide whether EPA's
redesignation of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation from Class II to Class I under the Clean Air Act
violated EPA's trust obligation to the neighboring Crow Tribe, which claimed that its development
plans were adversely affected by the redesignation. Nance, 654 F.2d at 710-11. The court con-
cluded that because the trust obligations conflicted and that there was a "strong possibility that the
Crow tribe would not be prejudiced at all. . . , we cannot say that there was a breach of the fiduciary
duty to the Crow." Id. at 711-12.
77. Morongo, 161 F.3d at 574; Pawnee, 830 F.2d at 191.
78. Pawnee, 830 F.2d at 191.
79. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 695 (1993) ("Having concluded that
Congress clearly abrogated the Tribe's pre-existing regulatory control over non-Indian hunting and
fishing, we find no evidence in the relevant treaties or statutes that Congress intended to allow the
Tribe to assert regulatory jurisdiction over these lands pursuant to inherent sovereignty.").
80. See, e.g., Bourland, 508 U.S. at 687-94.
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whether the underlying rationale for the trust responsibility-that the
tribes literally need protecting by the federal government-holds true
today. This skepticism ignores the reality that the great majority of tribes
still suffer from inordinately high rates of poverty. In the tribal immu-
nity context, the U.S. Supreme Court has questioned whether tribes still
need the protection that doctrine affords:
At one time, the doctrine of tribal immunity from suit might have
been thought necessary to protect nascent tribal governments from
encroachments by States. In our interdependent and mobile society,
however, tribal immunity extends beyond what is needed to safe-
guard tribal self-governance. This is evident when tribes take part in
the Nation's commerce. Tribal enterprises now include ski resorts,
gambling, and sales of cigarettes to non-Indians. In this economic
context, immunity can harm those who are unaware that they are
dealing with a tribe, who do not know of tribal immunity, or who
have no choice in the matter, as in the case of tort victims.81
Although the Court upheld the Tribe's immunity in the commercial
context in that case, the Court's misgivings about following a doctrine
that some members of the Court believe has lost its historic rationale
could signal a similar re-examination about the need for the trust respon-
sibility.
8 2
In the current hostile legal climate, arguments that the trust respon-
sibility requires federal agencies to act in the best interests of tribes, in-
dependent of their statutory duties, are likely to be greeted with skepti-
cism. The difficult task of developing practical and workable solutions
requires coordinated efforts by Indian tribes, lawyers, and scholars. At a
minimum, trust-related arguments in this area stand a better chance of
success if they are based on a tribal consensus about the core values that
the trust responsibility should preserve and protect. A few modest sug-
gestions are offered here in order to focus thinking toward litigation
strategies that might bear fruitful results.
First, arguments that rely on the trust obligation to require a more
rigorous consideration of the impacts of federal projects on tribal envi-
ronments may find a more favorable reception by courts instructed to
look for a statutory grounding for trust duties. For example, the trust
obligation can more sharply focus the NEPA analysis on the special con-
cerns of tribes for the welfare of the environment.8 3 The trust responsi-
81. Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 758 (1998) (citation
omitted).
82. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 757-58.
83. The decision of the Interior Board of Land Appeals in Island Mountain Protectors, 144
I.B.L.A. 168, 168 (1998) is an example. In that administrative appeal, the Board vacated the deci-
sion of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to approve expansion of the Zortman and Landusky
Mines adjacent to the Fort Belknap Reservation of the Assiniboine and Gros Ventre Tribes. See
Island Mountain Protectors, 144 I.B.L.A. at 185, 202-03. Among the grounds for vacatur was the
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bility can require the agency to treat Indian communities as tribes, rather
than merely as interested parties, or citizens of the affected area. NEPA
requires a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of proposed
federal action.84 The federal trust obligation can help turn a soft glance,
which agencies too often give actions affecting tribal environments, into
a genuinely hard look. Careful and thoughtful articulation of the con-
tinuing need for adherence to trust standards in this area can strengthen
the duty of federal agencies to rigorously apply the environmental stat-
utes to Indian country. The rhetoric of fiduciary obligations can perhaps
become the reality of legal protection for tribal environmental values and
goals.
Second, the trust responsibility may be useful as a means to require
the federal government to consult with tribes where the statutory duty to
do so is ambiguous. In an unreported decision, the U.S. District Court
for Oregon enjoined federal timber sales in the Winema and Fremont
National Forests that would have damaged natural habitat and resources
on which the Tribe depended.85 The court found that the U.S. Forest
Service had violated its duty arising from the trust responsibility to con-
sult with the Klamath Tribes to ensure that the Tribe's treaty rights will
be protected.86
These approaches, while holding some promise, may be too limited
for those tribes that must rely on the trust responsibility for a source of
substantive legal duties, for want of other efficacious legal theories to
protect their rights. For these tribes, enhanced procedural rights through
trust-infused environmental review or consultation processes may not be
enough to protect their land and resources from harm.87 For them, a
more ambitious approach is needed to empower the trust doctrine with
genuine legal protections. In light of the courts' reluctance to embrace
an expansive view of the trust responsibility in equitable actions, the
development of a cohesive theory of the trust doctrine as a source of sub-
BLM's violation of the trust responsibility owed the Tribes. Id. The Board characterized the trust
obligation as requiring consultation with the Tribes in order to "identify, protect, and conserve trust
resources, trust assets, and Tribal health and safety." Id at 185. The scope of this duty arguably
exceeded the BLM's duty to consult and consider environmental consequences under NEPA.
84. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
85. Klamath Tribes v. United States, No. 96-381-HA, 1996 WL 924509, at *1, *9-10 (D. Or.
Oct. 2, 1996).
86. Id. at *7-10.
87. A recent example is Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'n v. U.S. Bureau of Reclama-
tion, No. C 02-02006 SBA (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2005) (order of dismissal) (Yurok Tribe as Plaintiff-
intervenor). The district court there dismissed the Yurok Tribe's claims that the Bureau of Reclama-
tion had violated the federal trust responsibility to protect the Tribe's fishery by refusing to provide
Klamath River flows sufficient to avoid the massive fish kill that occurred on the Tribe's Reserva-
tion in the fall of 2002. Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'n, No. C 02-02006 SBA, at 0-1. The
court concluded that Reclamation had no trust duty to provide such flows because there could be no
violation of the trust responsibility because no source of "positive law" could be identified that
imposed specific fiduciary duties on Reclamation with regard to the operations of the Klamath
Irrigation Project, which controlled the River flows. Id. at 17.
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stantive law will be challenging. Law reform of this kind should be
based on the fundamental principle that federal law should honor and
protect the unique relationships of Indian tribes to their land and natural
environment. That surely was the premise of the trust doctrine originally
and it should be the basis of future efforts to give it genuine legal mean-
ing today.

